The Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) is the official export credit agency of the federal government, established in 1934 and operating under the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (12 U.S.C. § 635 et seq.). EXIM fills the gap when private sector lenders will not finance U.S. exports — providing direct loans, loan guarantees, and export credit insurance to foreign buyers of American goods and services. It is self-sustaining: EXIM collects fees and premiums that cover its administrative costs and has returned billions in net revenue to the U.S. Treasury over its history. In Fiscal Year 2024 alone, EXIM authorized $8.4 billion in financing, supporting approximately 38,000 American jobs across all 50 states.
Project 2025 proposes the complete abolition of the Export-Import Bank, labeling it "corporate welfare" and arguing that private markets can finance U.S. exports without government assistance. This analysis is both strategically blind and economically dishonest. The Heritage Foundation's hostility to EXIM ignores one central fact: China's Export-Import Bank (CEXIM) and China Development Bank together provide an estimated $300 billion or more in state-backed export financing annually, with over $289 billion in outstanding Belt and Road Initiative loans alone. American exporters competing for infrastructure contracts in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America do not compete against private lenders — they compete against the Chinese state. Abolishing EXIM would unilaterally disarm the United States in an economic competition that China has decided to wage through the full power of its government. The 2015-2019 quorum crisis — when Senate obstruction effectively paralyzed EXIM for four years and cost the U.S. economy an estimated $20 billion in overseas opportunities and nearly 250,000 potential jobs — demonstrates exactly what EXIM's opponents want: not a market solution, but American strategic retreat.
The next Democratic administration will not merely defend EXIM from abolition. It will expand EXIM's mandate, modernize its programs, restructure its clean energy and climate financing portfolio, dramatically improve small business access, weaponize the China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP) as a front-line instrument of strategic competition, and extend EXIM's reach into Africa and the developing world as a direct counter to China's Belt and Road Initiative. EXIM is not corporate welfare. It is American industrial strategy.
The Stakes: The question before the United States is not whether export credit financing is philosophically pure. It is whether American workers and companies will have the tools to compete and win in markets where China, Germany, Japan, France, and South Korea all deploy state-backed financing as a matter of industrial policy. Every dollar in EXIM financing that is denied by ideological obstruction is a dollar that China's state apparatus happily provides — with political strings attached and strategic objectives embedded. The future of American manufacturing exports, clean energy technology leadership, advanced semiconductor sales, and infrastructure contracting in the developing world depends on EXIM functioning at full capacity.
Key Reforms:
- Defend EXIM from abolition and enact long-term statutory reauthorization through 2040
- Enact board quorum protection legislation to prevent recurrence of the 2015-2019 paralysis
- Expand the China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP) from 20 percent to 30 percent of EXIM's financing authority
- Establish a Clean Energy Export Finance Initiative, targeting $5 billion annually in renewable energy, storage, and grid technology exports
- Restructure small business access programs to raise the small business share of financing volume from 19 percent to 35 percent within four years
- Create a dedicated Africa and Global South Competitiveness Program to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative in critical markets
- Establish mandatory worker rights and environmental standards as conditions of EXIM financing
- Expand EXIM financing for digital economy, artificial intelligence, 5G, and semiconductor technology exports
- Institute transparent climate risk screening across the full EXIM portfolio
- Increase EXIM staffing and modernize technology systems to reduce transaction processing times
Constitutional and Legal Basis: Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (12 U.S.C. § 635 et seq.); Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2019 (Pub. L. 116-94, Div. I, Title IV); OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits; Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. § 1862); Export Administration Regulations (15 C.F.R. Parts 730-774); Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Every major U.S. trading partner and strategic competitor maintains a robust official export credit agency. Understanding the scale of this competition is essential to evaluating the stakes of Project 2025's abolition agenda:
China (CEXIM and China Development Bank): China operates two major policy banks that provide export credit financing at a scale that dwarfs every other country. CEXIM alone had accumulated over $289 billion in outstanding Belt and Road Initiative loans as of early 2026. Chinese state financing is not OECD-compliant: it frequently offers below-market interest rates, tied-aid packages that require the use of Chinese companies and workers, and terms that create debt dependency in borrowing countries. China's annual export credit authorizations routinely exceed the combined total of all OECD export credit agencies.
Germany (Euler Hermes): Germany's export credit agency is one of Europe's largest, providing guarantees for German industrial exports — particularly machinery, automobiles, and industrial equipment. Germany's export finance system is closely coordinated with its Mittelstand industrial policy, ensuring that medium-sized German manufacturers have access to state-backed financing for export contracts.
Japan (JBIC and NEXI): Japan operates both the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), which provides direct loans and equity investments, and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI), which provides export credit insurance. Japan's export finance apparatus is particularly active in energy and infrastructure projects across Asia.
France (Bpifrance Assurance Export): France provides state guarantees for French exports through Bpifrance, with particular emphasis on aerospace (Airbus), defense, and energy equipment. France actively coordinates its export credit policy with its foreign policy objectives.
Against this landscape, the argument that the United States should unilaterally disarm is not a free-market argument — it is an argument for unilateral strategic retreat. EXIM is not optional. It is the minimum necessary instrument for American economic competition in a world where every other major power deploys state-backed export finance as a matter of national policy.
EXIM was established in 1934 under President Franklin Roosevelt as a tool to facilitate trade with the Soviet Union and Latin America. Over nine decades, it has evolved into a sophisticated financial institution that has supported American exports through every major economic cycle and geopolitical transition. Key historical benchmarks include:
- Over its lifetime, EXIM has supported more than 2.2 million American jobs
- EXIM has financed exports to over 180 countries, spanning every major industry
- During periods of full operational capacity, EXIM has been credited with sustaining American manufacturing competitiveness in sectors — commercial aviation, power generation, agricultural equipment — where U.S. companies face direct competition from European and Asian manufacturers backed by their own governments
- The institution has demonstrated resilience through recessions, financial crises, and geopolitical shifts, adapting its programs to changing market conditions
The 2015-2019 quorum crisis was not a verdict on EXIM's effectiveness — it was a political attack that demonstrated EXIM's importance by the economic damage its paralysis caused. The next Democratic administration will ensure that no future administration can use institutional sabotage as a policy instrument.
What Project 2025 Did:
Project 2025's Mandate for Leadership calls for the elimination of the Export-Import Bank, characterizing it as a vehicle for "corporate welfare" that distorts free markets and subsidizes large corporations at taxpayer expense. The Heritage Foundation has published numerous analyses arguing that EXIM should be terminated, that private financial markets are sufficient to finance U.S. exports, and that EXIM's financing disproportionately benefits Boeing, General Electric, and Caterpillar rather than small or medium-sized enterprises.
This ideological position ignores the operational reality of international export finance. The United States does not compete in export markets against other private-sector actors operating without government support. It competes against nations — China, Germany, Japan, France, South Korea — that deploy their full state apparatus to support their exporters. The OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, which governs minimum pricing and terms for export credit agencies, exists precisely because all major economies recognized that export credit financing is an instrument of national economic competition, not a market distortion to be eliminated.
The Project 2025 abolition proposal, if enacted, would produce the following concrete outcomes: American manufacturers of commercial aircraft, power generation equipment, renewable energy systems, telecommunications infrastructure, and agricultural equipment would lose financing tools available to their European and Asian competitors. Foreign buyers choosing between U.S. and Chinese suppliers would lose access to U.S.-backed financing competitive with CEXIM terms. The result is not a freer market — it is a market from which American exporters are absent.
The Ideological Incoherence:
The Heritage Foundation simultaneously argues that China's state capitalism represents a strategic threat to American prosperity and that the United States should unilaterally eliminate one of its primary tools for competing with China in third-country markets. Project 2025 cannot coherently argue that China's Belt and Road Initiative is a dangerous strategic expansion of Chinese influence while also arguing that the primary U.S. instrument for countering Chinese financing should be abolished. The abolition of EXIM would not strengthen free markets. It would cede markets to Chinese state capitalism unopposed.
What Project 2025 and Its Predecessors Did:
The 2015-2019 quorum crisis is not a historical accident. It is a deliberate tactical template. Senate conservatives refused to confirm board nominees for nearly four years after EXIM's reauthorization lapsed in June 2015. Because 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(3) requires a quorum of at least three of EXIM's five board members to approve transactions above $10 million, the Senate's refusal to confirm nominees effectively paralyzed EXIM's ability to approve the large transactions that constitute the bulk of its economic impact.
The consequences were severe and documented:
- EXIM lost the ability to approve transactions greater than $10 million from July 2015 through May 2019 — a period of nearly four years
- The annual dollar value of EXIM's new project authorizations fell by approximately five-sixths during the quorum period
- An estimated $40 billion in transactions sat in the EXIM pipeline unable to proceed
- The United States lost an estimated $20 billion in overseas business opportunities
- Approximately 250,000 American jobs that would have been supported by those transactions were never created
In May 2019, the Senate finally confirmed three board nominees, restoring EXIM's quorum. But the lesson drawn by Project 2025's architects is not that obstruction failed — it is that obstruction works. The Heritage Foundation's abolition agenda and the quorum weaponization tactic are two prongs of the same strategy: neutralize EXIM through either formal elimination or informal paralysis.
The Ongoing Vulnerability:
EXIM remains structurally vulnerable to quorum attacks. Board member terms expire on staggered schedules. A Senate majority hostile to EXIM can replicate the 2015-2019 playbook by simply refusing to schedule confirmation votes. The next Democratic administration must close this structural vulnerability through legislation that prevents the institution from being held hostage to confirmation politics.
What Project 2025 Did:
Project 2025 explicitly opposes climate-aligned restrictions on EXIM financing, demanding that EXIM resume robust financing for fossil fuel projects including coal, liquefied natural gas, and oil infrastructure abroad. The Biden administration's 2021 U.S. International Climate Finance Plan directed EXIM to end international financing for carbon-intensive fossil fuel-based energy projects, a policy direction consistent with U.S. commitments under the Paris Agreement and consistent with the strategic reality that clean energy is the fastest-growing segment of global energy investment.
Project 2025's reversal of climate-aligned financing policies would produce the following consequences:
- Lock developing countries into long-term fossil fuel infrastructure financed by U.S. taxpayer-backed instruments, while China simultaneously positions itself as the world's leading provider of clean energy financing
- Strand U.S. clean energy exporters — solar panel manufacturers, wind turbine producers, battery storage companies, grid technology firms — without EXIM financing tools competitive with what other nations' export credit agencies provide
- Undermine U.S. leadership in the sectors with the highest projected global growth in infrastructure investment over the next thirty years
What Project 2025 Did:
The 2019 reauthorization established the China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP) with a mandate to reserve at least 20 percent of EXIM's total $135 billion financing authority — or $27 billion — for transactions that counter Chinese export financing and advance U.S. leadership in strategic technology sectors. Project 2025's abolition agenda would eliminate CTEP entirely. This is a strategic gift to China.
CEXIM and the China Development Bank together deploy financing at a scale that dwarfs U.S. EXIM's capacity. CEXIM alone has accumulated over $289 billion in outstanding Belt and Road Initiative loans as of early 2026, financing more than 4,000 kilometers of railways, 23,000 kilometers of roads, 40 airports, and 30 ports in developing countries. These are not commercial transactions — they are geopolitical instruments. When a developing nation accepts Chinese financing for a port, that port may subsequently be available for Chinese naval use. When a government accepts CEXIM loans on terms it cannot repay, China acquires economic leverage over national policy decisions.
The CTEP was a rare bipartisan acknowledgment that U.S. export financing is a national security tool, not merely a trade policy instrument. Eliminating it would surrender the field to China in markets — artificial intelligence, 5G telecommunications, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, clean energy — that will define economic and security competition for the next generation.
What Project 2025 Did:
Project 2025's framework, in focusing exclusively on eliminating EXIM, failed entirely to grapple with the transformation of U.S. exports toward services, software, and digital economy goods. EXIM's existing underwriting standards were designed for traditional goods exports — aircraft, agricultural equipment, power generation systems. They do not adequately address the financing needs of American technology companies exporting cloud computing platforms, AI systems, cybersecurity software, and telecommunications networks.
The failure to modernize EXIM's technology sector financing tools has real consequences. American companies competing in developing world markets for telecommunications infrastructure, cloud computing contracts, and digital payment systems face Chinese competitors who deploy CEXIM financing as a bundled offering with Huawei equipment and Alibaba cloud services. Without EXIM tools tailored to technology exports, U.S. companies compete at a structural disadvantage.
Project 2025's response to this challenge is to eliminate EXIM entirely. The correct response is to modernize EXIM's programs to meet the competition where it actually exists.
The consequences of Project 2025's EXIM abolition agenda are concrete and fall disproportionately on manufacturing workers and small exporters:
- EXIM financing has historically supported 2.2 million U.S. jobs over the institution's lifetime; in FY2024 alone, $8.4 billion in authorizations supported 38,000 jobs
- During the 2015-2019 quorum crisis, an estimated $20 billion in exports and approximately 250,000 jobs were lost; a full abolition would multiply these losses across the entire EXIM portfolio permanently
- More than 85 percent of EXIM transactions by number already support small businesses; abolition would eliminate financing for small exporters competing in markets where private lenders will not go
- American manufacturers of renewable energy systems, advanced manufacturing equipment, medical devices, and agricultural technology would lose competitive footing against Chinese, German, and Japanese competitors backed by their governments' export credit agencies
- Workers in states with high concentrations of manufacturing exporters — Ohio, Michigan, Texas, California, Washington, Georgia — would bear the direct employment consequences of EXIM abolition
The Export-Import Bank rests on firm constitutional ground. Congress's authority to charter and fund EXIM derives from multiple constitutional provisions:
Commerce Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3): Congress has plenary authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations. The financing of U.S. exports is quintessentially foreign commerce. Congress's power to create instrumentalities that facilitate and regulate that commerce — including a bank that provides export financing — is well established.
Necessary and Proper Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18): In conjunction with the Commerce Clause and the foreign affairs power, the Necessary and Proper Clause supports Congress's creation of specialized financial institutions designed to advance national economic interests in foreign markets.
Foreign Affairs Power: The President and Congress share constitutional authority over foreign commerce and foreign policy. Export credit financing is explicitly an instrument of foreign policy — as Congress recognized in the 2019 reauthorization's CTEP provisions, which explicitly identified countering Chinese strategic financing as a national security objective. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015), confirms that foreign affairs tools that also have domestic economic dimensions remain within the constitutional power of the elected branches.
Property Clause (U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2): EXIM's loan and guarantee portfolio constitutes federal property; Congress's power to manage, dispose of, and leverage federal property in service of national objectives extends to the structuring of EXIM's financing programs.
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (12 U.S.C. § 635 et seq.): The foundational statute establishing EXIM, defining its mission, authorities, board structure, financing programs, and reporting requirements. Section 635(b)(1) establishes EXIM's purpose: to aid in financing and to facilitate exports of goods and services, imports, and the exchange of commodities and services between the United States or any of its territories or insular possessions and any foreign country or the agencies or nationals thereof.
Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2019 (Pub. L. 116-94, Div. I, Title IV): The most recent reauthorization, extending EXIM's charter through December 31, 2026. Section 402 established the China and Transformational Exports Program, directing EXIM to reserve not less than 20 percent of its total financing authority for transactions that counter Chinese export financing and advance U.S. leadership in AI, 5G, semiconductors, renewable energy, and other strategic technology sectors.
OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits: This multilateral agreement — to which the United States, European Union members, Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia, and other major economies are parties — establishes minimum pricing, maximum repayment terms, and other conditions for official export credit financing. The Arrangement exists because all major economies recognize that state-backed export finance is a legitimate tool of economic competition; the Arrangement structures competition to prevent subsidy races. EXIM's compliance with the Arrangement is required by statute (12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(B)).
Export Administration Regulations (15 C.F.R. Parts 730-774): Govern the national security review of EXIM transactions, ensuring that EXIM financing does not support the transfer of controlled technologies to adversary nations.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. § 1862): Provides additional authority relevant to EXIM's role in supporting U.S. trade competitiveness.
EXIM operates under a five-member board of directors, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The President designates a chair and a first vice chair. A quorum of three board members is required to approve transactions exceeding $10 million (12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(3)). This quorum requirement, originally designed to ensure deliberate oversight, became the mechanism for the 2015-2019 paralysis attack.
EXIM is self-financing: it collects fees, premiums, and interest payments that fund its operations. It does not receive annual appropriations for its lending programs; Congress instead sets a lending cap (currently $135 billion in outstanding exposure). EXIM has historically returned net revenues to the U.S. Treasury. The characterization of EXIM as a taxpayer-funded subsidy is false on its face. It is a government-chartered financial institution that covers its own costs through the fees it charges borrowers and the interest it earns on direct loans.
The United States operates within the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, which sets minimum interest rates, maximum repayment terms, and other parameters for export credit transactions. The Arrangement applies to export credit agencies across OECD member nations and is the framework within which EXIM competes with agencies such as Germany's Euler Hermes, France's Bpifrance Assurance Export, Japan's JBIC, and South Korea's KEXIM.
China is not a party to the OECD Arrangement. CEXIM operates outside OECD disciplines, offering concessional loans at below-market interest rates, extended repayment terms, and financing packages bundled with Chinese labor and materials requirements. This structural asymmetry — the United States bound by OECD rules, China unconstrained by them — is precisely why the 2019 CTEP legislation granted EXIM authority to be competitive with Chinese terms and why this administration must expand that authority further.
EXIM deploys three principal financing instruments, each addressing different gaps in private-sector export finance:
Direct Loans: EXIM provides direct loans to foreign buyers of U.S. exports at fixed interest rates when private financing is unavailable or inadequate. Direct loans are EXIM's most powerful instrument for large-scale transactions — as demonstrated by the $1.6 billion Angola solar mini-grid loan in FY2024 — and are particularly critical for transactions in developing markets where private lenders will not go or where loan tenors exceed what commercial banks will offer.
Loan Guarantees: EXIM guarantees repayment of loans made by private lenders to foreign buyers. The guarantee covers commercial and political risks, enabling private lenders to extend credit to buyers they would otherwise decline. Loan guarantees represent the largest share of EXIM's portfolio by number of transactions.
Export Credit Insurance: EXIM provides insurance to U.S. exporters against the risk that foreign buyers will default on payment. Export credit insurance is EXIM's primary tool for small business exporters, enabling companies with limited capital to extend credit terms to foreign buyers without bearing the full default risk. EXIM processed more than 6,000 export credit insurance applications in FY2024.
Each instrument serves a distinct market segment. The next administration will ensure that EXIM's programs are continuously evaluated for gaps — sectors, geographies, or transaction types where the programs are inadequate — and that new instruments are developed where existing tools fall short.
The most persistent misinformation in the debate over EXIM is the claim that it costs taxpayers money. EXIM is self-funded through fees, premiums, and loan interest. Over its history, EXIM has returned net revenue to the Treasury. It does not compete with private lenders — it finances transactions that private lenders will not take. The Congressional Budget Office's methodology for scoring EXIM transactions on a fair-value basis — which accounts for market risk in a way that EXIM's own accounting does not — produces a different number, but that methodology applies a private-sector discount rate to a government program that does not price risk the same way as private markets and is not a measure of actual cash flows.
The responsible policy position is not to abolish EXIM because of a contested accounting methodology. It is to ensure that EXIM's risk management is sound, its fees are appropriately calibrated to cover expected losses, and its portfolio is diversified across sectors, geographies, and counterparties. The next administration will conduct a comprehensive actuarial review of EXIM's portfolio within the first 90 days and publish findings publicly.
The existential vulnerability of EXIM is its reauthorization requirement. Every several years, a determined Senate minority can threaten the institution's continued operation. Every change in administration raises the possibility of a new quorum attack. The next Democratic administration will seek legislation that eliminates these structural vulnerabilities permanently.
Permanent Reauthorization: Work with Congress to enact permanent statutory authorization for EXIM, eliminating the recurring reauthorization cycle that creates hostage-taking opportunities. If permanent authorization is not achievable, the minimum acceptable alternative is a 15-year reauthorization extending through at least 2040.
Quorum Protection Act: Enact legislation amending 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(3) to provide that, in the event board vacancies reduce the board below a quorum and the Senate has failed to act on a presidential nomination for more than 180 days, the remaining board members shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of conducting EXIM business. Alternatively, provide that incumbent members serve in holdover status until successors are confirmed, and that the absence of a quorum does not limit EXIM's authority to approve transactions pending confirmation. The 2015-2019 crisis must never be allowed to recur.
Bipartisan Board Composition: The statute's existing requirement for bipartisan board composition — no more than three members of the same political party — is appropriate and should be maintained. Streamline the confirmation process through Senate rules changes and expedited confirmation procedures for nominees to financial regulatory agencies.
Increased Staffing and Operational Capacity: Direct EXIM to hire at least 150 additional staff across underwriting, business development, small business outreach, and international offices. EXIM processes more than 6,000 Export Credit Insurance applications annually; current processing times average 6-10 days for insurance applications, but large-deal underwriting can take months. Increased staffing will reduce transaction timelines and enable EXIM to compete effectively with foreign export credit agencies that often process applications more quickly.
The 2019 CTEP mandate — 20 percent of EXIM's financing authority reserved for China-competition and strategic technology transactions — was a first step. It is insufficient for the scale of the challenge. CEXIM deploys hundreds of billions of dollars annually. U.S. EXIM's total authorization cap is $135 billion in outstanding exposure. The asymmetry is severe.
Expand the CTEP Mandate: Work with Congress to increase the CTEP reserve from 20 percent to 30 percent of EXIM's total financing authority, while simultaneously seeking congressional authorization to increase the overall lending cap from $135 billion to $200 billion outstanding.
Strategic Technology Sectors: Prioritize CTEP financing in the following sectors explicitly identified in 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(E) as national security priorities: artificial intelligence and machine learning; 5G and next-generation telecommunications; advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment; quantum computing; biotechnology and biomanufacturing; advanced aviation and aerospace; civil nuclear power technology; and renewable energy systems and storage.
Competitive Pricing Authority: Amend the Export-Import Bank Act to grant EXIM explicit authority to offer below-OECD-minimum pricing on CTEP transactions when China's state financing offers terms that cannot otherwise be matched. Where China deploys concessional loans at below-market rates as strategic instruments, the United States must have the legal authority to deploy equivalent instruments. This authority shall be subject to national security review, congressional notification within 30 days, and annual reporting to Congress.
Interagency Coordination: Establish a formal Interagency China Export Finance Coordination Committee, chaired by EXIM, with membership including the Departments of Commerce, State, Treasury, Defense, and the U.S. Trade Representative. The committee will coordinate U.S. government financing tools — EXIM, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the Millennium Challenge Corporation — to present comprehensive U.S. financing packages that can compete with integrated Chinese BRI offers.
Intelligence Integration: Require the Director of National Intelligence to provide EXIM's board, on a classified basis, quarterly briefings on Chinese export financing activities, BRI project pipelines, and CEXIM lending terms in strategic markets. EXIM board members making CTEP decisions must have visibility into the competitive intelligence environment.
Climate change is the defining challenge of the 21st century, and the global clean energy transition represents the largest infrastructure investment opportunity in human history. The International Energy Agency projects that global clean energy investment must reach $4 trillion annually by 2030 to meet climate targets. American companies — solar manufacturers, wind turbine producers, battery storage firms, advanced grid technology developers, electric vehicle manufacturers — are global leaders in clean energy technology. EXIM must be the financial instrument that puts those American technologies to work in global markets.
Clean Energy Export Finance Initiative: Issue a presidential directive establishing the Clean Energy Export Finance Initiative within EXIM, with a target of $5 billion in annual clean energy financing authorizations by FY2028. This initiative will encompass solar energy systems, wind power, advanced grid technology, battery storage, green hydrogen, zero-emission transportation, and energy efficiency technology. In FY2024, EXIM authorized $2.3 billion in clean energy financing — more than doubling the FY2023 total of $1.1 billion. The initiative will more than double FY2024 performance within four years.
Angola Solar as Template: EXIM's $1.6 billion direct loan for solar mini-grids in Angola in FY2024 — at the time the largest renewable energy deal in EXIM history — demonstrates what is possible. This transaction expanded clean power access to underserved populations, supported American clean energy exporters, and countered Chinese infrastructure financing in Africa. It should be a template, not an exception. The next administration will direct EXIM to identify at least ten comparable large-scale renewable energy projects for financing in Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and South Asia within the first two years.
Climate Risk Screening: Require EXIM to integrate climate risk analysis — both transition risk and physical risk — into the underwriting of all transactions with tenors of ten years or greater. Transactions financing long-lived fossil fuel infrastructure will be subject to enhanced review and will require demonstration that the financed assets will not become stranded before loan repayment. This is sound financial risk management as well as climate policy.
Phased Fossil Fuel Restrictions: Direct EXIM to adopt a binding policy ending financing for new coal power generation immediately, with a phased transition away from oil and gas infrastructure financing aligned with international commitments under the OECD Arrangement's Common Approaches on Environment and Social Due Diligence. Enforce the 2021 policy direction from the Biden administration that sought to align EXIM financing with the U.S. International Climate Finance Plan.
Just Transition Provisions: Require that EXIM financing for clean energy projects in developing countries include provisions supporting labor standards, training programs for workers displaced from fossil fuel industries, and community benefit agreements with affected communities.
EXIM processed more than 1,400 transactions in FY2024, and more than 85 percent by count supported small businesses. But by dollar value, small businesses received only approximately 19 percent of EXIM's total authorizations. Large corporations with sophisticated treasury operations and established banking relationships can access EXIM's largest programs independently. Small and medium-sized exporters often cannot navigate EXIM's systems, cannot provide required collateral, and lack the banking relationships needed to access EXIM's delegated authority programs. The result is structural: EXIM's transaction count favors small business, but its financing volume does not.
Small Business Volume Target: Establish a statutory target requiring that at least 35 percent of EXIM's total annual financing authorizations by dollar volume support small and medium-sized enterprises as defined under 15 U.S.C. § 632. Report progress against this target to Congress annually and require EXIM to develop a corrective action plan in any fiscal year where the target is missed.
Equity Express and Underserved Business Expansion: Scale EXIM's Equity Express Select program — launched in April 2024 to support underserved businesses in building export capacity — to reach at least 5,000 additional small businesses annually by FY2027. Specifically target businesses owned by women, minorities, veterans, and rural entrepreneurs.
Delegated Authority Expansion: Expand EXIM's delegated authority programs, under which commercial banks pre-approved by EXIM can issue EXIM-backed export credit insurance without individual EXIM review. Increase the number of delegated authority lenders from the current base, with particular emphasis on community development financial institutions (CDFIs) and minority depository institutions (MDIs) that serve underserved small business exporters.
Regional Office Expansion: EXIM operates a limited number of regional offices that provide direct outreach to small business exporters. Direct EXIM to open at least five new regional offices in underserved geographic markets within the first two years, with priority for regions with high concentrations of manufacturing small and medium-sized enterprises that lack established export finance relationships.
Supply Chain Financing: Expand EXIM's Supply Chain Finance programs to allow large EXIM borrowers to extend EXIM-backed financing to their small business suppliers, enabling small manufacturers to participate in export contracts even when they are not the direct exporter. This model extends EXIM's reach deep into domestic manufacturing supply chains.
Technology Modernization: Direct EXIM to complete the modernization of its transaction processing systems within 18 months, including online application portals, automated preliminary underwriting, and real-time status tracking for all applications. Reduce the average processing time for small business export credit insurance applications from the current 6-10 days to 3-5 business days.
China's Belt and Road Initiative has reshaped infrastructure financing in the developing world. CEXIM has financed more than 4,000 kilometers of railways, 23,000 kilometers of roads, 40 airports, and 30 ports in BRI partner countries, with over $289 billion in outstanding BRI loans. The United States has competing interests — democratic governance, debt transparency, labor rights, environmental standards — and competing products. For too long, the U.S. government's approach to BRI competition has been rhetorical rather than operational. The next administration will change that.
Africa and Global South Competitiveness Program: Establish within EXIM a dedicated Africa and Global South Competitiveness Program, with a goal of $3 billion annually in financing for projects in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Latin America by FY2028. In the 13 years from 2010 to 2023, EXIM supported $13.5 billion in transactions in sub-Saharan Africa alone. This is insufficient given the scale of Chinese financing in the same region during the same period.
Integrated U.S. Government Package: Direct EXIM to work jointly with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and USAID to develop integrated financing packages for major infrastructure projects in target countries. When the United States competes for an infrastructure contract against a Chinese state-backed proposal, the full array of U.S. financing tools must be marshaled to present a competitive package — not piecemeal, uncoordinated offers from separate agencies.
Debt Transparency Standards: Require that all EXIM financing in the developing world comply with the G20 Principles for Debt Transparency and the Institute of International Finance's Voluntary Principles for Debt Transparency. EXIM shall publish the full terms of its financing agreements in target markets, distinguishing U.S.-backed financing — transparent, standards-compliant, and free of political conditions — from Chinese financing that frequently carries undisclosed conditions.
Local Content and Partnership Requirements: Require that EXIM-financed projects in developing countries include provisions for local workforce training, local procurement where feasible, and technology transfer to local partners. This distinguishes U.S.-backed financing from Chinese BRI financing, which frequently imports Chinese labor and materials without building local economic capacity.
Strategic Pipeline Identification: Identify, within 90 days of the new administration taking office, at least 20 specific infrastructure projects in strategic countries where Chinese BRI financing is being actively considered, and develop competitive U.S. financing proposals for each. Prioritize ports, digital infrastructure, energy systems, and transportation corridors with strategic military or commercial significance.
EXIM financing — backed by the U.S. government and ultimately by U.S. taxpayers — must not support projects that violate fundamental worker rights or cause significant environmental harm. The next administration will establish binding standards, not aspirational guidelines.
International Labor Organization Core Standards: Require that all EXIM-financed projects in excess of $10 million comply with International Labour Organization (ILO) Core Conventions, including prohibitions on forced labor, child labor, and discrimination, and protections for freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. Require borrowers to certify compliance as a condition of EXIM financing, and establish a monitoring and enforcement mechanism with authority to suspend or revoke financing for violations.
Environmental Due Diligence: Strengthen EXIM's implementation of the Common Approaches on Environment and Social Due Diligence — the OECD framework governing environmental review of export credit transactions — by establishing an independent Environmental Review Office within EXIM with authority to recommend project rejection or modification. Currently, EXIM's environmental review process is advisory. Make it binding.
Project-Level Monitoring: Require post-disbursement monitoring of environmental and labor standards compliance for all EXIM-financed projects above $25 million. Engage independent third-party monitors where in-country oversight capacity is limited. Make monitoring reports publicly available, subject to appropriate confidentiality protections for commercially sensitive information.
Davis-Bacon and Prevailing Wage: For EXIM-financed projects that involve U.S. goods and services produced domestically, require compliance with the Davis-Bacon Act (40 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq.) wage standards for U.S. manufacturing workers involved in the production of exported goods.
The global economy is undergoing rapid technological transformation. The sectors with the highest growth trajectories — artificial intelligence, 5G telecommunications, advanced semiconductors, quantum computing, cloud computing infrastructure, biotechnology — are sectors where American companies lead globally. EXIM must adapt its programs to finance technology exports that do not fit traditional export credit templates built around physical goods with tangible asset collateral.
Digital Economy Financing Standards: Develop, within 180 days, updated EXIM underwriting standards for financing digital economy exports — software, cloud services, AI platforms, cybersecurity systems, telecommunications infrastructure — that do not have traditional tangible asset collateral but represent high-value American exports with strong revenue-generating potential.
Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment: Designate semiconductor manufacturing equipment as a CTEP priority sector and direct EXIM to engage proactively with U.S. semiconductor equipment manufacturers to develop financing packages for sales to allied and partner countries seeking to build domestic chip production capacity. This directly supports U.S. national security interests in limiting China's access to advanced semiconductor technology while expanding American exports.
5G and Telecommunications: Expand EXIM financing for sales of U.S.-manufactured 5G telecommunications equipment and network infrastructure to allied and partner governments pursuing Chinese vendor alternatives. Work with the State Department's Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN) diplomacy initiative to ensure EXIM financing is available for U.S. equipment in every country where the United States is actively promoting alternatives to Huawei and other Chinese suppliers.
Cybersecurity Exports: Identify cybersecurity systems, software, and services as a priority EXIM financing sector, consistent with both the CTEP mandate and U.S. national security interests in strengthening allied and partner cyber defenses against adversary intrusion.
Public trust in EXIM requires robust transparency and accountability mechanisms. Export credit financing has historically been vulnerable to corruption — in both the borrowing countries and, in some cases, in the institutions providing financing. The next administration will establish a culture of transparency at EXIM that distinguishes U.S.-backed financing from Chinese BRI financing and from domestic-politics-driven cronyism.
Transaction Transparency: Publish all EXIM financing approvals above $1 million on a publicly accessible database within 30 days of approval, including the borrower, the U.S. exporter, the transaction amount, the sector, the tenor, and the interest rate. Currently, EXIM publishes summary information; full transparency requires disclosure of terms. Where commercial confidentiality genuinely requires protection, develop a tiered disclosure system that protects legitimately sensitive information while maximizing public accountability.
Beneficial Ownership Disclosure: Require disclosure of the beneficial owners of all foreign entities receiving EXIM financing above $10 million. EXIM financing must not benefit entities ultimately owned by sanctioned persons, foreign governments that are state sponsors of terrorism, or entities subject to anti-money laundering concerns. Coordinate with the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to implement beneficial ownership verification before transaction approval.
Inspector General Strengthening: EXIM's Inspector General has authority to investigate fraud, waste, and abuse in EXIM programs. Direct the Inspector General to conduct annual risk-based audits of EXIM's portfolio, focusing on sectors and geographies with elevated corruption risk. Ensure the Inspector General's office is staffed at a level commensurate with EXIM's transaction volume.
Ethics and Revolving Door: Require EXIM employees who approve transactions above $10 million to adhere to a two-year cooling-off period before employment by any entity that received EXIM financing during their tenure. This is consistent with revolving-door restrictions applied to other federal financial regulators.
Annual Competitiveness Report Enhancement: The Export-Import Bank Act requires EXIM to submit an annual Competitiveness Report to Congress documenting EXIM's performance relative to other export credit agencies. Direct EXIM to expand this report to include: a transaction-level comparison of deals won and lost to Chinese financing; an assessment of CTEP program effectiveness; small business access metrics; clean energy financing performance against targets; and Africa and Global South program results. Make the full report publicly available.
- Issue a presidential directive reaffirming EXIM's permanent place in U.S. trade and economic policy and directing all executive branch agencies to coordinate with and support EXIM's mission
- Designate acting leadership for all EXIM board positions vacant at the start of the administration, ensuring immediate quorum capacity
- Direct EXIM to suspend and review any policy changes made by the prior administration that limited EXIM's lending authority, restricted clean energy financing, or weakened environmental and labor standards
- Issue a presidential memorandum establishing the Interagency China Export Finance Coordination Committee, chaired by the EXIM President, with participation from Treasury, Commerce, State, Defense, USTR, DFC, and NSC
- Direct EXIM to publish within 30 days a complete inventory of the transaction pipeline — deals submitted but unable to proceed due to policy or staffing constraints — and develop a prioritized processing plan
- Direct the Office of Management and Budget to confirm that EXIM's self-funding status is appropriately reflected in federal budget scoring and to resist any effort to classify EXIM operations as discretionary spending subject to appropriations-level interference
- Direct the Secretary of State to send diplomatic cables to all U.S. embassies in strategic markets alerting embassy commercial attaches to EXIM's expanded role and directing them to actively identify EXIM-eligible transactions in their host countries
- Submit to Congress the Export-Import Bank Permanent Authorization and Quorum Protection Act, establishing permanent EXIM authorization and closing the quorum vulnerability
- Direct EXIM to establish the Clean Energy Export Finance Initiative with internal staffing, underwriting guidelines, and a target pipeline of candidate transactions
- Direct EXIM to open consultations with the DFC and MCC on the first set of integrated U.S. financing packages for developing world infrastructure projects
- Submit to Congress the CTEP Expansion Act, increasing the CTEP reserve to 30 percent and the overall lending cap to $200 billion
- Direct EXIM to complete a 90-day review of all EXIM financing programs and submit recommendations for expanding small business volume share
- Nominate a full slate of EXIM board members, including candidates with specific expertise in clean energy finance, trade in services, digital economy, and developing world infrastructure
- Achieve Senate confirmation of a full five-member EXIM board
- Enact the Export-Import Bank Permanent Authorization and Quorum Protection Act
- Publish new EXIM environmental and labor standards as binding policy, with enforcement mechanisms
- Launch the Africa and Global South Competitiveness Program with an initial $500 million pipeline
- Open at least three new EXIM regional offices in underserved markets
- Complete modernization of EXIM's transaction processing technology platform
- Achieve $3 billion in clean energy financing authorizations in FY2026
- Launch expanded Equity Express program serving at least 2,000 additional underserved businesses
- Establish the EXIM Digital Economy Underwriting Standards covering AI, 5G, cloud, and cybersecurity exports
- Achieve $5 billion annual clean energy financing authorizations by FY2028
- Achieve $3 billion annual Africa and Global South financing by FY2028
- Raise small business financing volume share from 19 percent to at least 30 percent by FY2028
- Deploy full CTEP authority at the expanded 30 percent level, financing major strategic technology transactions in AI, semiconductors, 5G, and clean energy
- Identify and present competitive U.S. financing packages for at least 20 strategic infrastructure projects in markets where China is actively competing
- Publish comprehensive annual reports on EXIM's competitive performance relative to Chinese, European, and other major export credit agencies, with honest assessment of gaps and progress
- Establish EXIM as a recognized alternative to Chinese BRI financing in at least ten priority developing markets
- Complete implementation of full digital economy financing standards and achieve at least $1 billion in technology sector (AI, cybersecurity, cloud, 5G) EXIM authorizations annually
- Seek enactment of all five legislative proposals identified in this chapter; if Congress does not act within 24 months, pursue maximum administrative implementation of the same policy objectives within existing statutory authority
- Conduct a comprehensive mid-term review of EXIM's portfolio performance, risk concentrations, and program effectiveness; publish findings and an updated strategic plan for the final two years of the administration
- Expand the Interagency China Export Finance Coordination Committee's scope to include formal intelligence sharing protocols and a classified annex to EXIM's annual Competitiveness Report documenting Chinese state financing activities in strategic markets
- Purpose: Establish EXIM's permanent statutory authorization and eliminate the structural vulnerabilities that allow quorum attacks and reauthorization-cycle obstruction
- Key Provisions: (1) Strike the existing reauthorization sunset from 12 U.S.C. § 635 and replace with permanent authorization; (2) Amend 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(3) to provide that if presidential nominations to fill board vacancies have been pending before the Senate for more than 180 days without action, the remaining board members constitute a quorum for all purposes; (3) Provide that incumbent board members serve in holdover status until successors are confirmed and sworn; (4) Increase the statutory lending cap to $200 billion in outstanding exposure
- Constitutional Authority: Commerce Clause, art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Necessary and Proper Clause, art. I, § 8, cl. 18
- Purpose: Expand EXIM's China and Transformational Exports Program and establish competitive pricing authority to counter Chinese state export financing
- Key Provisions: (1) Increase CTEP reserve from 20 percent to 30 percent of EXIM's total financing authority; (2) Grant EXIM authority to offer financing at below-OECD-minimum rates on CTEP transactions when competing with Chinese state financing, subject to national security review, congressional notification within 30 days, and annual reporting to Congress; (3) Add advanced biotechnology, quantum computing, advanced aviation, and civil nuclear technology to the list of CTEP-priority sectors; (4) Require EXIM to publish an annual CTEP Competitive Effectiveness Report
- Constitutional Authority: Commerce Clause; Foreign Affairs Power; Necessary and Proper Clause
- Purpose: Establish the Clean Energy Export Finance Initiative as a statutory program within EXIM with a binding annual authorization target
- Key Provisions: (1) Establish the Clean Energy Export Finance Initiative with a statutory target of $5 billion in annual clean energy financing authorizations by FY2028; (2) Require EXIM to develop and publish clean energy export financing standards within 180 days; (3) Prohibit EXIM from approving new financing for coal power generation; (4) Require climate risk screening for all transactions with tenors of ten years or greater; (5) Require just transition provisions in EXIM-financed clean energy projects in developing countries
- Constitutional Authority: Commerce Clause; Foreign Affairs Power; Treaty Power (Paris Agreement)
- Purpose: Restructure EXIM small business programs to raise the small business share of financing volume and expand access for underserved entrepreneurs
- Key Provisions: (1) Establish a statutory target of 35 percent of EXIM total annual financing volume for small and medium-sized enterprises; (2) Require annual reporting on SME volume share with corrective action plans when targets are missed; (3) Direct EXIM to open at least five new regional offices within two years, with priority for underserved geographic markets; (4) Expand delegated authority to CDFIs and MDIs; (5) Require EXIM to establish financing standards for service exports and digital economy goods accessible to small businesses
- Constitutional Authority: Commerce Clause; Necessary and Proper Clause
- Purpose: Establish binding worker rights and environmental standards as conditions of EXIM financing
- Key Provisions: (1) Require compliance with ILO Core Conventions as a condition of EXIM financing for all transactions above $10 million; (2) Require post-disbursement monitoring and independent third-party verification for transactions above $25 million; (3) Establish an independent Environmental Review Office within EXIM with binding authority; (4) Require publication of all EXIM loan agreements in developing countries subject to G20 Debt Transparency Principles; (5) Authorize EXIM to suspend or revoke financing for documented violations of labor or environmental conditions
- Constitutional Authority: Commerce Clause; Treaty Power (ILO Conventions; OECD Common Approaches)
- Purpose: Establish the Africa and Global South Competitiveness Program as a statutory program within EXIM with dedicated staffing, funding for business development, and a binding annual financing target
- Key Provisions: (1) Establish the Africa and Global South Competitiveness Program within EXIM with a statutory target of $3 billion in annual financing authorizations in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Latin America by FY2028; (2) Require EXIM to maintain dedicated country officers for at least 10 priority markets in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America; (3) Authorize EXIM to establish co-financing arrangements with the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and other multilateral development banks for transactions in developing markets; (4) Require EXIM to publish annually a report on Chinese BRI financing activity in priority markets and EXIM's competitive response; (5) Direct the Secretary of State to assign EXIM liaison officers to at least 20 U.S. embassies in priority developing markets
- Constitutional Authority: Commerce Clause; Foreign Affairs Power; Spending Clause
- Purpose: Modernize EXIM's underwriting standards and programs to address the financing needs of U.S. digital economy and advanced technology exporters
- Key Provisions: (1) Require EXIM to publish updated underwriting standards for digital economy exports — including software-as-a-service, AI platforms, cloud computing, and cybersecurity services — within 180 days of enactment; (2) Designate semiconductor manufacturing equipment, 5G telecommunications infrastructure, AI systems, and cybersecurity technology as priority sectors for CTEP financing with dedicated staffing; (3) Require EXIM to establish a Technology Export Advisory Council composed of representatives from the U.S. technology industry to advise EXIM on emerging financing gaps; (4) Authorize EXIM to finance service exports and technology licensing arrangements in addition to tangible goods, consistent with WTO rules
- Constitutional Authority: Commerce Clause; Necessary and Proper Clause; Foreign Affairs Power
Financing Volume and Jobs:
- Total EXIM annual authorizations: increase from $8.4 billion (FY2024) to $15 billion by FY2028
- U.S. jobs supported annually: increase from 38,000 (FY2024) to 70,000 by FY2028
- Small business financing volume share: increase from 19 percent (FY2024) to 35 percent by FY2028
Clean Energy:
- Annual clean energy financing authorizations: reach $5 billion by FY2028 (from $2.3 billion in FY2024)
- Number of major renewable energy project financings in developing countries: at least 10 by FY2026
Strategic Competition:
- CTEP transactions as share of total financing: increase from 20 percent to 30 percent by FY2027
- Number of infrastructure projects in developing world where U.S. financing competed successfully against Chinese state proposals: at least 15 by FY2028
- EXIM financing in sub-Saharan Africa annually: reach $2 billion by FY2028
Small Business and Equity:
- Number of underserved small businesses reached through Equity Express and related programs: at least 5,000 annually by FY2027
- Number of new regional offices opened: at least 5 by end of Year 2
- Number of delegated authority lenders including CDFIs and MDIs: increase by at least 30 institutions by FY2027
- Average processing time for small business insurance applications: reduce to 3-5 business days
Institutional Integrity:
- Board quorum status: full five-member confirmed board in place throughout the administration's term
- Environmental and labor compliance monitoring: 100 percent of transactions above $25 million with active post-disbursement monitoring by end of Year 2
Transparency and Accountability:
- Transaction disclosure: 100 percent of approvals above $1 million publicly disclosed within 30 days by end of Year 1
- Inspector General audits completed: at least one risk-based portfolio audit per fiscal year
- Annual Competitiveness Report published publicly within 90 days of fiscal year end in each year of the administration
- Number of beneficial ownership verifications completed prior to transaction approval: 100 percent of transactions above $10 million by end of Year 1
China Competition:
- Number of CTEP transactions financed: increase year-over-year in each year of the administration
- Number of diplomatic posts with active EXIM pipeline development programs: at least 40 by FY2027
- Number of countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, and South Asia with active EXIM financing within a four-year period: at least 30 by FY2028
- Annual report to Congress on deals lost to Chinese state financing: published starting FY2026, with analysis of pricing and term differentials
Statutes:
- Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, 12 U.S.C. § 635 et seq.
- Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2019, Pub. L. 116-94, Div. I, Title IV (Dec. 20, 2019)
- Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2019, Sec. 402 (China and Transformational Exports Program), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(E)
- Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 632 (definition of small business concern)
- Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq.
- Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862
Regulations:
- Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. Parts 730-774
- EXIM Environmental Procedures and Guidelines, 12 C.F.R. Part 408
International Agreements:
- OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (as revised)
- OECD Common Approaches on Environment and Social Due Diligence
- G20 Principles for Debt Transparency (2020)
- ILO Core Conventions (Conventions No. 29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182)
- Paris Agreement on Climate Change, entered into force Nov. 4, 2016
Key Cases:
- Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015) (scope of executive foreign affairs power)
- McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Necessary and Proper Clause; federal instrumentalities)
Government Reports and Data:
- Export-Import Bank of the United States, FY 2024 Annual Performance Report (2024)
- Export-Import Bank of the United States, Report to the U.S. Congress on Global Export Credit Competition (June 2024)
- Congressional Research Service, Export-Import Bank: Overview and Issues for Congress, IF10017 (updated 2025)
- Congressional Research Service, Export-Import Bank: Overview and Reauthorization Issues, R43581 (2019)
- Congressional Research Service, Export-Import Bank Financing of Fossil Fuel Projects, IF12819 (2024)
- CSIS, The U.S. EXIM Bank in an Age of Great Power Competition (2023)
- EXIM, China and Transformational Exports Program: Strategic Context and Congressional Mandate (2024)
- EXIM, Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory Committee Reports and Program Documentation (2024)
- EXIM, Environmentally Beneficial Exports Program Documentation and Annual Statistics (2024)
- EXIM, Small Business Year in Review (2024)
- U.S. Senate Hearing, Oversight and Reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, 116th Congress (2019)
- CNBC, For Want of a Quorum, America's Jobs Are Being Lost (March 2019)
- Norton Rose Fulbright, The Export-Import Bank of the United States Has Been Revived (2019)
Heritage Foundation Source Documents (Opposition Research):
- The Heritage Foundation, U.S. Export-Import Bank: Corporate Welfare on the Backs of Taxpayers (2014)
- The Heritage Foundation, Kill the Export-Import Bank (various years)
- The Heritage Foundation, Trump's Disappointing Flip-Flop on the Export-Import Bank (2019)
Multilateral Development Context:
- Asia Society Policy Institute, Export-Import Bank of China: Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative Toolkit (2024)
- Wilson Center, China Exim Bank in Africa (2023)
- NTU-SBF Centre for African Studies, The Role of EXIM Bank in Promoting Trade and Investments in Africa (2024)
- G20, Principles for Debt Transparency (2020)
- OECD, Common Approaches on Environment and Social Due Diligence (as revised 2023)
- International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2024 (projections for clean energy investment needs)
- Oxfam America, The US EXIM Bank: How to Make It Work for Climate and Development (2023)
- ImpactAlpha, US Export-Import Bank Bucks the Green Finance Agenda (2024)
- Axios Pro Climate Deals, EXIM Financing for Clean Energy Soared in Fiscal 2024 (November 2024)
- Asia Society Policy Institute, Export-Import Bank of China White Paper on Green Finance and Social Responsibility (2024)
- The Exchange Asia, China EXIM Bank Has Over US$289 Billion in Belt and Road Loans (2026)
- Amberhill Global Solutions, Leveraging EXIM Bank's Programs to Finance Renewable Energy Projects Globally (2024)