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• OpenSSH 8.4

  It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the SHA-1 algorithm for less than USD$50K. For this reason, we will be disabling the "ssh-rsa" public key signature algorithm by default in a near-future release. This algorithm is unfortunately still used widely despite the existence of better alternatives, being the only remaining public key signature algorithm specified by the original SSH RFCs. The better alternatives include: The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These algorithms have the advantage of using the same key type as "ssh-rsa" but use the safe SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the client and server support them. The ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in OpenSSH since release 6.5. The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These have been supported by OpenSSH since release 5.7. To check whether a server is using the weak ssh-rsa public key algorithm, for host authentication, try to connect to it after removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list:

  Overdue by 5 year(s)

  •

  Due by January 29, 2021

  •0/1 issues closed
  0% complete1 open0 closed

• release standards 2

  No due date

  •17/18 issues closed
  94% complete1 open17 closed