Fix typos in LLM05 Supply Chain docs

Archive/2_0_candidates/JohnSotiropoulos_LLM05_SupplyChainVulnerabilities.md

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Some of the risks discussed here are also discussed in [ Data and Model Poisonin
 3. Using a **vulnerable pre-trained model**. Models are binary black boxes and unlike open source, static inspection can offer little to security assurances. Vulnerable pre-trained models can contain hidden biases, backdoors, or other malicious features that have not been identified through  the safety evaluations of model repository. Vulnerable models can be created by both poisoned datasets and direct model tampering using techniques such as ROME also known as lobotomisation.
 4. **Weak Model Provenance**. Currently there are no strong assurances in published models. Model Cards and associated documentation provide model information and relied upon users, but they offer no guarantees on the origin of the model. An attacker can compromise supplier account on a model repo or create a similar on and combine it with social engineering techniques to compromise the supply-chain of an LLM application.
 5. **Vulnerable LoRA adapters**. LoRA (Low-Rank Adaptation) is a popular fine-tuning technique that enhances modularity by allowing pre-trained layers to be bolted onto an existing large language model (LLM). The method increases efficiency but create new risks, where a malicious LorA adapter compromises the integrity and security of the pre-trained base model. This can happen both in collaborative model merge environments but also exploiting the support for LoRA from popular inference deployment platforms such as vLMM and OpenLLM where adapters can be downloaded and applied to a deployed model.
-6. **Exploit Collaborative Development Processes**.  Collaborative model merge and model manipulation models (e.g. conversions) hosted in shared environments can be exploited to introduce vulnerabilities in shared models. Model Merging is is very popular on Hugging Face with model-merged models topping the OpenLLM leaderboard and can be exploited to by pass reviews.  Similar, services such as conversation bot have been proved to be vulnerable to maniputalion and introduce malicious code in LLMs.
+6. **Exploit Collaborative Development Processes**.  Collaborative model merge and model manipulation models (e.g. conversions) hosted in shared environments can be exploited to introduce vulnerabilities in shared models. Model Merging is very popular on Hugging Face with model-merged models topping the OpenLLM leaderboard and can be exploited to by pass reviews.  Similar, services such as conversation bot have been proved to be vulnerable to manipulation and introduce malicious code in LLMs.
 7. **LLM Model on Device supply-chain vulnerabilities**. LLM models on device increase the supply attack surface with compromised manufactured processes and exploitation of device OS or fimware vulnerabilities to compromise models. Attackers can reverse engineer and re-package applications with tampered models. 
 8. **Unclear T&Cs and data privacy policies of the model operators** lead to the application's sensitive data being used for model training and subsequent sensitive information exposure. This may also apply to risks from using copyrighted material by the model supplier.
 

Archive/2_0_voting/archive_voting_round_one/candidate_files/SupplyChainVulnerabilities.md

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Some of the risks discussed here are also discussed in [ Data and Model Poisonin
 3. Using a **vulnerable pre-trained model**. Models are binary black boxes and unlike open source, static inspection can offer little to security assurances. Vulnerable pre-trained models can contain hidden biases, backdoors, or other malicious features that have not been identified through  the safety evaluations of model repository. Vulnerable models can be created by both poisoned datasets and direct model tampering using techniques such as ROME also known as lobotomisation.
 4. **Weak Model Provenance**. Currently there are no strong assurances in published models. Model Cards and associated documentation provide model information and relied upon users, but they offer no guarantees on the origin of the model. An attacker can compromise supplier account on a model repo or create a similar on and combine it with social engineering techniques to compromise the supply-chain of an LLM application.
 5. **Vulnerable LoRA adapters**. LoRA (Low-Rank Adaptation) is a popular fine-tuning technique that enhances modularity by allowing pre-trained layers to be bolted onto an existing large language model (LLM). The method increases efficiency but create new risks, where a malicious LorA adapter compromises the integrity and security of the pre-trained base model. This can happen both in collaborative model merge environments but also exploiting the support for LoRA from popular inference deployment platforms such as vLMM and OpenLLM where adapters can be downloaded and applied to a deployed model.
-6. **Exploit Collaborative Development Processes**.  Collaborative model merge and model manipulation models (e.g. conversions) hosted in shared environments can be exploited to introduce vulnerabilities in shared models. Model Merging is is very popular on Hugging Face with model-merged models topping the OpenLLM leaderboard and can be exploited to by pass reviews.  Similar, services such as conversation bot have been proved to be vulnerable to maniputalion and introduce malicious code in LLMs.
+6. **Exploit Collaborative Development Processes**.  Collaborative model merge and model manipulation models (e.g. conversions) hosted in shared environments can be exploited to introduce vulnerabilities in shared models. Model Merging is very popular on Hugging Face with model-merged models topping the OpenLLM leaderboard and can be exploited to by pass reviews.  Similar, services such as conversation bot have been proved to be vulnerable to manipulation and introduce malicious code in LLMs.
 7. **LLM Model on Device supply-chain vulnerabilities**. LLM models on device increase the supply attack surface with compromised manufactured processes and exploitation of device OS or fimware vulnerabilities to compromise models. Attackers can reverse engineer and re-package applications with tampered models. 
 8. **Unclear T&Cs and data privacy policies of the model operators** lead to the application's sensitive data being used for model training and subsequent sensitive information exposure. This may also apply to risks from using copyrighted material by the model supplier.
 

Archive/2_0_voting/voting_round_two/LLM03_SupplyChain.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Some of the risks discussed here are also discussed in [ Data and Model Poisonin
 4. Using a **vulnerable pre-trained model**. Models are binary black boxes and unlike open source, static inspection can offer little to security assurances. Vulnerable pre-trained models can contain hidden biases, backdoors, or other malicious features that have not been identified through the safety evaluations of model repository. Vulnerable models can be created by both poisoned datasets and direct model tampering using techniques such as ROME also known as lobotomisation.
 5. **Weak Model Provenance**. Currently there are no strong assurances in published models. Model Cards and associated documentation provide model information and relied upon users, but they offer no guarantees on the origin of the model. An attacker can compromise supplier account on a model repo or create a similar on and combine it with social engineering techniques to compromise the supply-chain of an LLM application.
 6. **Vulnerable LoRA adapters**. LoRA (Low-Rank Adaptation) is a popular fine-tuning technique that enhances modularity by allowing pre-trained layers to be bolted onto an existing large language model (LLM). The method increases efficiency but create new risks, where a malicious LorA adapter compromises the integrity and security of the pre-trained base model. This can happen both in collaborative model merge environments but also exploiting the support for LoRA from popular inference deployment platforms such as vLMM and OpenLLM where adapters can be downloaded and applied to a deployed model.
-7. **Exploit Collaborative Development Processes**. Collaborative model merge and model manipulation models (e.g. conversions) hosted in shared environments can be exploited to introduce vulnerabilities in shared models. Model Merging is is very popular on Hugging Face with model-merged models topping the OpenLLM leaderboard and can be exploited to by pass reviews. Similar, services such as conversation bot have been proved to be vulnerable to maniputalion and introduce malicious code in LLMs.
+7. **Exploit Collaborative Development Processes**. Collaborative model merge and model manipulation models (e.g. conversions) hosted in shared environments can be exploited to introduce vulnerabilities in shared models. Model Merging is very popular on Hugging Face with model-merged models topping the OpenLLM leaderboard and can be exploited to by pass reviews. Similar, services such as conversation bot have been proved to be vulnerable to manipulation and introduce malicious code in LLMs.
 8. **LLM Model on Device supply-chain vulnerabilities**. LLM models on device increase the supply attack surface with compromised manufactured processes and exploitation of device OS or fimware vulnerabilities to compromise models. Attackers can reverse engineer and re-package applications with tampered models.
 9. **Unclear T&Cs and data privacy policies of the model operators** lead to the application's sensitive data being used for model training and subsequent sensitive information exposure. This may also apply to risks from using copyrighted material by the model supplier.