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Gogs Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Organization Teams Information Disclosure via API

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jun 19, 2026 in gogs/gogs • Updated Aug 13, 2026

Package

gomod gogs.io/gogs (Go)

Affected versions

< 0.14.3

Patched versions

0.14.3

Description

Summary

Gogs has an unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability. The GET /api/v1/orgs/:orgname/teams endpoint at internal/route/api/v1/org_team.go:8 returns all teams for any organization without requiring authentication. The route group at internal/route/api/v1/api.go:380-385 lacks the reqToken() middleware, and the listTeams() handler performs no authentication check, exposing team IDs, names, descriptions, and permission levels to any unauthenticated caller.

Affected Versions

Gogs (all current versions)

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause: Missing reqToken() middleware on org teams route group

internal/route/api/v1/api.go lines 380-385:

// Org teams route group — no reqToken() middleware
m.Group("/:orgname", func() {
    m.Get("/teams", org.ListTeams) // No auth required
}, orgAssignment(true))

The orgAssignment(true) middleware only loads the organization object — it performs no authentication. The listTeams() handler at org_team.go:8 returns all teams unconditionally:

func ListTeams(c *context.APIContext) {
    org := c.Org.Organization
    teams, err := database.GetTeamsByOrgID(org.ID)
    // Returns all teams — no c.IsLogged check, no permission check
}

Compare with other org endpoints that correctly require authentication:

m.Group("/orgs/:orgname", func() {
    // ... other endpoints ...
}, reqToken(), orgAssignment(true, true)) // reqToken() enforces auth

Attack Chain

  • Attacker sends GET /api/v1/orgs/target-org/teams with no authentication
  • orgAssignment(true) loads the organization but does not check auth
  • ListTeams() queries all teams and returns them
  • Response includes team IDs, names, descriptions, and permission levels (read/write/admin/owner)

Proof of Concept

# List all teams in an organization — no authentication needed
curl -s "http://TARGET:3000/api/v1/orgs/myorg/teams" | python3 -m json.tool

# Expected: 200 OK with full team list
# [
#   {
#     "id": 1,
#     "name": "Owners",
#     "description": "Admin team",
#     "permission": "owner"
#   },
#   {
#     "id": 2,
#     "name": "backend-devs",
#     "description": "Backend development team",
#     "permission": "write"
#   }
# ]

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can:

  • Enumerate all teams within any organization, including private/internal teams
  • Discover team permission levels (read/write/admin/owner), aiding privilege escalation planning
  • Map organizational structure and identify high-value targets (admin/owner teams)
  • Harvest team IDs for use in other API calls that may have weaker authorization checks

Suggested Remediation

m.Group("/:orgname", func() {
    m.Get("/teams", org.ListTeams)
}, reqToken(), orgAssignment(true))

Add reqToken() middleware to the org teams route group, consistent with other authenticated org endpoints. Additionally, ListTeams() should verify the authenticated user is a member of the organization.

References

@unknwon unknwon published to gogs/gogs Jun 19, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jun 23, 2026
Reviewed Jun 23, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Jun 24, 2026
Last updated Aug 13, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity None
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(63rd percentile)

Weaknesses

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-52815

GHSA ID

GHSA-744x-3838-5r56

Source code

Credits

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