Impact
A privilege escalation vulnerability affects Woodpecker instances using the Kubernetes backend.
The pipeline option backend_options.kubernetes.serviceAccountName was passed directly to the pod spec without any admin gating.
Who is impacted: any operator running the Kubernetes backend. Any user with Push permission on a connected repository can run pipeline pods under an arbitrary ServiceAccount in the pipeline namespace, gaining that account's RBAC permissions. If a privileged ServiceAccount is reachable in that namespace, this can lead to secret exfiltration (database credentials, API keys, TLS certs) and full cluster takeover.
Patches
woodpecker-ci/woodpecker#6792
Workarounds
Operators who cannot upgrade immediately can mitigate by any of:
- Restrict Push access on repositories connected to the Kubernetes-backed instance to
trusted users only.
- Harden the pipeline namespace: ensure no privileged ServiceAccount exists or is bound in
the namespace where pipeline pods run; keep the default ServiceAccount minimally privileged.
- Disable ServiceAccount token automounting for ServiceAccounts that should not be used by
pipelines.
- Enforce an admission policy (e.g. OPA/Gatekeeper, Kyverno, or a ValidatingAdmissionPolicy)
that rejects pipeline pods setting an unexpected serviceAccountName.
- Use a dedicated, isolated namespace per org/instance with no sensitive RBAC bindings.
Resources
- Vulnerable option introduced in commit
609ba481b5e912f59aaae8ca7bc22b44523c5e37
- Affected versions:
v1.0.0 through v3.15.0
- Source:
pipeline/backend/kubernetes/backend_options.go (field ServiceAccountName),
pipeline/backend/kubernetes/pod.go (assigned to pod spec with no gating)
References
Impact
A privilege escalation vulnerability affects Woodpecker instances using the Kubernetes backend.
The pipeline option
backend_options.kubernetes.serviceAccountNamewas passed directly to the pod spec without any admin gating.Who is impacted: any operator running the Kubernetes backend. Any user with Push permission on a connected repository can run pipeline pods under an arbitrary ServiceAccount in the pipeline namespace, gaining that account's RBAC permissions. If a privileged ServiceAccount is reachable in that namespace, this can lead to secret exfiltration (database credentials, API keys, TLS certs) and full cluster takeover.
Patches
woodpecker-ci/woodpecker#6792
Workarounds
Operators who cannot upgrade immediately can mitigate by any of:
trusted users only.
the namespace where pipeline pods run; keep the
defaultServiceAccount minimally privileged.pipelines.
that rejects pipeline pods setting an unexpected
serviceAccountName.Resources
609ba481b5e912f59aaae8ca7bc22b44523c5e37v1.0.0throughv3.15.0pipeline/backend/kubernetes/backend_options.go(fieldServiceAccountName),pipeline/backend/kubernetes/pod.go(assigned to pod spec with no gating)References