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Argo CD: Kubernetes Secret Extraction via ArgoCD ServerSideDiff via sensitive annotations

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published May 13, 2026 in argoproj/argo-cd • Updated May 19, 2026

Package

gomod github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 (Go)

Affected versions

>= 3.2.0, <= 3.2.11
>= 3.3.0-rc1, <= 3.3.9
>= 3.4.0-rc1, <= 3.4.1

Patched versions

3.2.12
3.3.10
3.4.2

Description

Summary

The original fix for GHSA-3v3m-wc6v-x4x3 is incomplete. argocd app diff --server-side-diff can still expose Kubernetes Secret values embedded in the kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration annotation.

The prior fix masks top-level Secret data in ServerSideDiff responses, but it does not fully sanitize Secret data stored inside the last-applied-configuration annotation. If a Secret was previously created or updated using client-side apply, that annotation may contain raw data, stringData, and sensitive annotations. These values can be shown in UI/CLI diffs.

Details

The ServerSideDiff endpoint returns ResourceDiff.TargetState / LiveState based on server-side dry-run output. Kubernetes server-side dry-run can return a full predicted live Secret object that carries forward existing live annotations, including:

kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration
For Secrets created with client-side apply, that annotation can contain a JSON-serialized Secret manifest with sensitive values.

The masking path calls HideSecretData(target, live, ...). However, HideSecretData only rewrites the last-applied annotation on the second argument (live). In server-side diff, the first argument can be predictedLive, not a clean Git target. predictedLive can also contain kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration, so the first object’s embedded annotation can remain unmasked.

PoC

Create an app containing this Secret manifest:

apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
  name: last-applied-secret-repro
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
  name: secret
  namespace: last-applied-secret-repro
  annotations:
    app: test
    token: SECRETVAL
type: Opaque
data:
  password: U0VDUkVUVkFM
  username: U0VDUkVUVkFM

Create and Sync Argo App

apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Application
metadata:
  name: last-applied-secret-repro
  namespace: argocd
  annotations:
    argocd.argoproj.io/compare-options: ServerSideDiff=true,IncludeMutationWebhook=true
spec:
  project: default
  destination:
    server: https://kubernetes.default.svc
    namespace: last-applied-secret-repro
  source:
    repoURL: https://github.com/YOUR_ORG/YOUR_REPO.git
    targetRevision: HEAD
    path: last-applied-secret-repro
  syncPolicy:
    automated:
      prune: true
      selfHeal: true
    syncOptions:
      - CreateNamespace=true
      - ServerSideApply=true

Run argo cd app diff
argocd app diff last-applied-secret-repro --server-side-diff --exit-code=false

❯ argocd app diff last-applied-secret-repro --server-side-diff --exit-code=false

===== /Secret last-applied-secret-repro/secret ======
10c10,11
<     kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration: '{"apiVersion":"v1","data":{"password":"++++++++","username":"++++++++"},"kind":"Secret","metadata":{"annotations":{"app":"test","argocd.argoproj.io/tracking-id":"last-applied-secret-repro:/Secret:last-applied-secret-repro/secret","token":"SECRETVAL"},"name":"secret","namespace":"last-applied-secret-repro"},"type":"Opaque"}'
---
>     kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration: |
>       {"apiVersion":"v1","data":{"password":"U0VDUkVUVkFM","username":"U0VDUkVUVkFM"},"kind":"Secret","metadata":{"annotations":{"app":"test","argocd.argoproj.io/tracking-id":"last-applied-secret-repro:/Secret:last-applied-secret-repro/secret","token":"SECRETVAL"},"name":"secret","namespace":"last-applied-secret-repro"},"type":"Opaque"}

The secret value can be seen inside the diff

Impact

Authenticated Argo CD users who can view application diffs may be able to read Secret values that should be masked.

Impacted values include:
Secret data embedded in kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration

References

@crenshaw-dev crenshaw-dev published to argoproj/argo-cd May 13, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database May 19, 2026
Reviewed May 19, 2026
Last updated May 19, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS score

Weaknesses

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. Learn more on MITRE.

Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer

The product stores, transfers, or shares a resource that contains sensitive information, but it does not properly remove that information before the product makes the resource available to unauthorized actors. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-45737

GHSA ID

GHSA-rg3g-4rw9-gqrp

Source code

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