tweetly

Self-hosted automation layer for X (Twitter), built around the Model Context Protocol. Bring your own AI agent — Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, anything that speaks MCP — and tweetly executes the post / engage / read actions on X through a real browser session, not the public API.

Live demo: tw-panel.beydemir.dev — request a magic link with your email, mint a tk_* API key, plug it into your MCP client. For production, self-host on your own infrastructure — see Deploy below.

Disclaimer

tweetly does not use X's official public API. It drives X through a real browser session (Patchright + persisted cookies). Two consequences follow:

It may violate X's Terms of Service. Automation, third-party session sharing, and synthetic engagement all sit in ToS gray/red territory. Account suspension risk is on you.
This is not a vetted enterprise product. The repository is a research / personal-use project. Run a risk assessment before pointing it at customer accounts in production.

All liability remains with the user under the MIT License — see LICENSE.

Project status

Public beta. The auth, action engine, MCP, and REST surfaces are stable; breaking changes are documented in CHANGELOG.md. Coverage: 403 unit tests + 24 integration tests on every push.

MCP clients verified against this build:

Claude Code (CLI)
Claude Desktop
Cursor (via MCP HTTP transport)
ChatGPT custom GPT actions (REST)
Generic MCP clients via /mcp/sse

Known weak spots are tracked as labeled issues — see open issues and especially security and good first issue for current priorities.

Quick start

Get a local dev instance posting noop actions in under five minutes.

# 1. Clone and install
git clone https://github.com/beydemirfurkan/tweetly.git
cd tweetly
npm install
npm --prefix backend install --legacy-peer-deps
npm --prefix frontend install
npx patchright install chromium

# 2. Generate a 32-byte master key, then paste it into ENCRYPTION_KEY in .env
cp .env.example .env
node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64'))"

# 3. Start postgres and apply migrations
docker compose up -d postgres
npm run db:migrate

# 4. Run backend + frontend
npm run dev:backend   # http://localhost:3001
npm run dev:frontend  # http://localhost:3000

Open http://localhost:3000, request a magic link with your email (the link is logged to backend stdout in dev), and mint a tk_* API key from the panel.

For real X delivery, set X_EXECUTOR_MODE=patchright and connect an X account; for dry runs, leave it as noop. See Connect an X account for the full server-side login flow.

Architecture

Stack: NestJS 11, TypeScript, PostgreSQL + TypeORM, Patchright (anti-detection browser), Model Context Protocol SDK, Next.js 16, React 19, Tailwind v4.

High-level flow

flowchart LR
    Client["AI agent<br/>(Claude Code, Cursor, ...)"]
    Panel["Panel<br/>(Next.js 16)"]

    subgraph Backend["NestJS backend"]
        direction TB
        Guard["ApiKeyGuard<br/>(tk_* user keys)"]
        REST["REST · /api/v1/*"]
        MCP["MCP · /mcp/sse"]
        Engine["Action engine<br/>(claim · retry · circuit breaker)"]
        Browser["XBrowserService<br/>+ executors (Patchright)"]
    end

    DB[("PostgreSQL<br/>(actions, accounts,<br/>monitors, jobs)")]
    X[("X · twitter.com")]
    Webhook["Tenant webhook<br/>receivers"]

    Client -- "MCP / Bearer tk_*" --> Guard
    Panel -- "REST / Bearer tk_*" --> Guard
    Guard --> REST
    Guard --> MCP
    REST --> Engine
    MCP --> Engine
    Engine --> Browser
    Engine <--> DB
    Browser --> X
    Engine -- "monitor events" --> Webhook

Post-tweet sequence

sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant Agent as AI agent
    participant API as Backend API
    participant Q as Action queue (Postgres)
    participant W as ClaimWorker
    participant X as Patchright → X

    Agent->>API: post_tweet(text, account)<br/>Authorization: Bearer tk_*
    API->>API: ApiKeyGuard verifies key<br/>resolves userId, accountId
    API->>Q: INSERT post_actions (pending)
    API-->>Agent: 202 { id, idempotencyKey }
    loop every WORKER_POLL_MS
        W->>Q: SELECT FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED
        Q-->>W: claim row → status=claimed
        W->>X: launch context, navigate, post
        alt success
            X-->>W: tweet URL
            W->>Q: status=succeeded
        else transient failure
            W->>Q: status=pending (retry, backoff)
        else permanent failure
            W->>Q: status=dead
        end
    end

Project layout

backend/src/
  accounts/          Account management (per-user X session tokens)
  action-engine/     ClaimWorker, ExecutorRegistry, CircuitBreaker, RetryPolicy
                     GenericActionRepository (FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED)
  admin-api/         AdminApiController, AdminTokenGuard, AdminApiService
  ai-copilot/        Optional content analysis (env-gated to specific emails)
  auth/              UsersService, ApiKeyService, MagicLinkService, ApiKeyGuard
  content-memory/    Jaccard similarity dedup (optional)
  domain/            Port interfaces, domain services, action types
  mcp/               MCP server (SSE transport, ~43 tools)
  monitoring/        Account monitor + webhook delivery
  oauth/             OAuth2 authorization server for MCP clients
  observability/     HealthController, MetricsController (Prometheus)
  persistence/       TypeORM DataSource, entities, migrations
  public-api/        REST controllers under /api/v1, user-scoped
  settings/          Per-account override-aware settings service
  x-automation/      XBrowserService, XPostFlowService, SelectorRegistry
                     NoOp + Patchright executors per action type

frontend/src/
  app/[locale]/      Next.js 16 panel (i18n: tr/en)
  components/        Shadcn-based UI
  i18n/              next-intl config
  lib/               API client, auth context, hooks

Action state machine

pending → claimed → running → succeeded
                           ↘ failed → pending (retry)
                                    ↘ dead
         ↘ cancelled (admin)

Every action type (post, reply, like, bookmark, retweet, quote, follow, unlike, unretweet, unfollow, delete_tweet, dm, profile_update, avatar_update, banner_update) lives in its own Postgres table for predictable indexes, idempotency keys, and per-type metrics.

MCP tool surface

Same Zod schemas back the MCP and REST surfaces, so a tool name in MCP maps 1:1 to a route in REST.

Write (queue-backed): post_tweet · reply_to_tweet · like_tweet · retweet_tweet · quote_tweet · bookmark_tweet · follow_account · post_thread · unlike_tweet · unretweet_tweet · unfollow_account · delete_tweet · send_dm · update_profile · update_avatar · update_banner

Read (synchronous): search_tweets · get_user · get_tweet · get_user_tweets · search_users · get_user_followers · get_user_following · get_tweet_retweeters · get_tweet_quotes · get_tweet_replies · get_user_mentions · get_x_trending · get_user_likes · get_my_bookmarks · get_thread · get_mutual_followers · get_user_lists · get_list · get_list_members · get_list_subscribers

Bulk extractions (async, file output): create_extraction · get_extraction · list_extractions · cancel_extraction

Management: get_accounts · get_account_health · connect_x_account · reauth_x_account · get_x_login_job · list_actions · cancel_action · replay_action · get_settings · update_settings

Monitor: create_monitor · list_monitors · get_monitor · rotate_secret · delete_monitor · pause_monitor

Breaking (2026-05-03): retweet → retweet_tweet, unretweet → unretweet_tweet. Old names now return Unknown tool.

Setup

git clone https://github.com/beydemirfurkan/tweetly.git
cd tweetly
npm install
npm --prefix backend install --legacy-peer-deps
npm --prefix frontend install
npx patchright install chromium

cp .env.example .env
# Generate a 32-byte master key and paste it as ENCRYPTION_KEY in .env:
node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64'))"

docker compose up -d postgres
npm run db:migrate

Commands

npm run build          # tsc → dist/ for backend; next build for frontend
npm run dev:backend    # backend dev server (http://localhost:3001)
npm run dev:frontend   # frontend dev server (http://localhost:3000)
npm test               # backend unit tests + frontend tests
npm run lint           # backend + frontend lint
npm run typecheck      # backend + frontend type-check

npm run db:migrate                            # apply pending migrations
npm run db:migrate:revert                     # revert the last migration
npm --prefix backend run db:migrate:generate -- <Name>  # diff entities → src/persistence/migrations/<ts>-<Name>.ts

Smoke tests

Run the MCP and REST tool matrix against a local backend before deploying:

cd backend
TWEETLY_API_KEY=tk_... TWEETLY_ACCOUNT_ID=your-x-handle npm run smoke:mcp
TWEETLY_API_KEY=tk_... TWEETLY_ACCOUNT_ID=your-x-handle npm run smoke:rest

# Include X read paths
TWEETLY_API_KEY=tk_... TWEETLY_ACCOUNT_ID=... TWEETLY_SMOKE_SUITE=read npm run smoke:mcp
TWEETLY_API_KEY=tk_... TWEETLY_ACCOUNT_ID=... TWEETLY_SMOKE_SUITE=read npm run smoke:rest

# Queue/write tools require explicit opt-in
TWEETLY_API_KEY=tk_... TWEETLY_ACCOUNT_ID=... TWEETLY_SMOKE_SUITE=queue \
  TWEETLY_ALLOW_WRITE_SMOKE=true \
  TWEETLY_TARGET_TWEET_URL=https://x.com/.../status/... \
  npm run smoke:mcp

The destructive suite (delete_tweet, update_profile, send_dm, unfollow, ...) only runs against a throwaway test account with TWEETLY_ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE_SMOKE=true.

Environment variables

Variable	Required	Description
`DATABASE_URL`	Yes	PostgreSQL connection URL
`ENCRYPTION_KEY`	Yes	32-byte base64/hex master key for AES-256-GCM encryption of login credentials AND X session cookies (`auth_token`, `ct0`, `auth_multi`, `twid`). See "Rotating ENCRYPTION_KEY" below
`X_EXECUTOR_MODE`	Yes	`patchright` for real X delivery; `noop` for local dry-runs
`BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_TOKEN`	First boot	Temporary token used to seed `secrets.admin_token` in the DB
`BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_EMAIL`	First boot	Email of the first admin user to create
`CORS_ORIGINS`	Production	Comma-separated origin allowlist (empty rejects all)
`REDIS_URL`	Multi-instance	Required when running 2+ backend replicas
`AI_COPILOT_ADMIN_EMAILS`	Optional	Comma-separated emails authorized for the AI Copilot module (empty disables)
`TRUST_PROXY`	Optional	`app.set('trust proxy', ...)` value for IP-based rate limit accuracy behind a reverse proxy

After first boot, write a permanent admin token to the DB and remove BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_TOKEN:

curl -X PUT -H "Authorization: Bearer $BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"adminToken":"<another-random-32-byte-hex>"}' \
  http://localhost:3001/admin/secrets

SMTP credentials live in the database

Magic-link emails ship through SMTP. No SMTP variables are read from env — credentials live in the DB via PUT /admin/secrets. Pick a provider (Postmark, Mailgun, SES, Gmail, ...) and write the credentials in:

curl -X PUT -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_API_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "mailProvider": "smtp",
    "smtpHost": "smtp.postmarkapp.com",
    "smtpPort": 587,
    "smtpUser": "your-server-token",
    "smtpPass": "your-server-token",
    "smtpSecure": false,
    "mailFrom": "tweetly <noreply@yourdomain.com>"
  }' \
  http://localhost:3001/admin/secrets

The transporter rebuilds on the next magic-link send — no restart needed. Updating credentials at the same endpoint cycles the previous transporter automatically. If mailProvider stays console (the default), magic links are written to backend stdout — ideal for local dev.

Connect an X account

tweetly logs into X through its own browser automation; users never copy auth_token / ct0 / twid. Kick off a server-side login job:

curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TWEETLY_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"foo","password":"x-password","email":"foo@example.com","totpSecret":null,"saveTotpSecret":false,"proxyCountry":"TR"}' \
  http://localhost:3001/api/v1/accounts/connect

The response is 202 Accepted with a jobId. Poll its status:

curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TWEETLY_API_KEY" \
  http://localhost:3001/api/v1/accounts/login-jobs/$JOB_ID

When a session breaks, re-authenticate the same account:

curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TWEETLY_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"password":"x-password","email":"foo@example.com","totpSecret":null,"saveTotpSecret":false,"proxyCountry":"TR"}' \
  http://localhost:3001/api/v1/accounts/foo/reauth

proxyCountry is optional. If omitted, the backend uses LOGIN_DEFAULT_PROXY_COUNTRY; for reauth, it falls back to the account's stored proxy_country. X temporarily blocks bursts of logins from the same server IP, so configuring per-region egress proxies in production is recommended:

LOGIN_DEFAULT_PROXY_COUNTRY=TR
LOGIN_FALLBACK_PROXY_COUNTRIES=US,DE
LOGIN_PROXY_TR=http://user:pass@tr.proxy.example:8080
LOGIN_PROXY_US=http://user:pass@us.proxy.example:8080

If the X onboarding flow returns a transient "try again later" or stalls on the username step, the worker retries once with the first configured fallback proxy country.

Session expiry semantics

1+ consecutive auth failures — an "Expired token?" badge appears on the Accounts list (hover for the last error reason).
3 consecutive auth failures — the account is auto-paused. Queued actions are held; production stalls until you re-authenticate from the panel.

API key onboarding

The panel is the canonical place to mint and manage tk_* keys.

Request a magic link. Visit http://localhost:3000 (or your panel domain), enter your email. In dev with mailProvider=console, copy the link from backend logs. In prod, click the link in the email.
Verify the link. Hitting the URL opens /auth/verify, which exchanges the token for a panel session.
Mint a key. Open the API Keys page, click Create, give it a label, copy the tk_* value — it is shown once.
Use the key. Send Authorization: Bearer tk_... to any /api/v1/* endpoint or the /mcp/sse connection.
Revoke when needed. The panel lists every key with last-used timestamp; revoke compromises immediately.

Auth model summary

tk_* user keys → /mcp/*, /api/v1/* (the user's own accounts, multi-tenant)

secrets.admin_token → /admin/* (operator/sysadmin endpoints, all users)

Never hand the admin token to an MCP client.

MCP connection

# After minting a tk_* key from the panel:
claude mcp add tweetly --url http://localhost:3001/mcp/sse \
  --header "Authorization: Bearer $TWEETLY_API_KEY"

Then, inside your agent: "Post 'hello world' through tweetly" triggers post_tweet, the action engine enqueues it, and Patchright publishes on X.

Webhook HMAC verification

When you create a monitor, the response includes webhookSecret — shown once. Your webhook receiver must verify the X-Tweetly-Signature header:

// Express example
app.post('/tweetly-webhook', express.raw({ type: 'application/json' }), (req, res) => {
  const header = req.header('X-Tweetly-Signature') ?? '';
  const [tPart, vPart] = header.split(',');
  const ts = tPart?.split('=')[1];
  const sig = vPart?.split('=')[1];
  if (!ts || !sig) return res.status(400).end();

  const expected = crypto
    .createHmac('sha256', process.env.TWEETLY_WEBHOOK_SECRET)
    .update(`${ts}.${req.body.toString('utf8')}`)
    .digest('hex');

  if (!crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(sig), Buffer.from(expected))) {
    return res.status(401).end();
  }
  if (Math.abs(Date.now() / 1000 - Number(ts)) > 300) return res.status(401).end();

  const payload = JSON.parse(req.body.toString('utf8'));
  // ...
  res.status(200).end();
});

Lost the secret? Rotate via POST /api/v1/monitors/:id/rotate-secret.

Admin API

# Public
curl http://localhost:3001/health
curl http://localhost:3001/ready

# Status / metrics (admin token required)
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_API_TOKEN" http://localhost:3001/admin/status
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_API_TOKEN" http://localhost:3001/metrics
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_API_TOKEN" http://localhost:3001/admin/queue/depth

# Action management
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_API_TOKEN" "http://localhost:3001/admin/actions?type=post&status=dead"
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_API_TOKEN" http://localhost:3001/admin/actions/post/UUID/replay
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_API_TOKEN" http://localhost:3001/admin/actions/post/UUID/cancel

Rotating `ENCRYPTION_KEY`

The same ENCRYPTION_KEY protects (a) login-job passwords + TOTP secrets and (b) X session cookies (auth_token, ct0, auth_multi, twid). All ciphertext is stamped with a v1: version prefix.

A naive key swap invalidates every stored credential. For zero-downtime rotation:

Generate the new key (keep the old one):

node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64'))"

Bump cipher version in code: edit backend/src/common/crypto/credential-cipher.service.ts to introduce a v2: envelope using the new key, while keeping the v1: decrypt path mapped to the old key (parallel-decrypt window). Cookies/credentials written from this point use v2:; existing v1: payloads continue to decrypt with the old key.
Deploy, run for a migration window (24–72h is typical).
One-shot re-encrypt existing v1: rows under the new key:
```
COOKIE_ENCRYPT_MIGRATE=true tsx backend/src/scripts/encrypt-account-cookies.ts
```
(This script is also the path used when retro-fitting cookie encryption to a deployment that ran with plaintext cookies before the change landed.)
Remove the old key + v1: decrypt path in a follow-up release.

If you skip steps 2–4, you must instead force every user through a reconnect (POST /api/v1/accounts/:id/login-jobs) — old cookies become unreadable and recordSessionFailure will quickly pause those accounts.

Trust proxy (`TRUST_PROXY`)

The backend's IP-based rate limits — /auth/request-link (5/min, anti-mail-bomb) and /oauth/register (10/hr, anti-DCR-spam) — rely on Express's req.ip being the real client. Behind a reverse proxy or load balancer, req.ip defaults to the proxy's loopback address and X-Forwarded-For is not trusted, so the throttler effectively rate-limits the proxy, not the caller.

Set TRUST_PROXY to tell Express which upstream hops to trust. The right value depends on the deployment shape:

Layout	`TRUST_PROXY`	Notes
Local dev, no proxy	unset (defaults to `loopback`)	safe default
nginx / Coolify, single host	`loopback,linklocal,uniquelocal`	trust the proxy on the same network
Cloudflare in front of origin	`loopback,linklocal,uniquelocal`	CF rewrites the IP into `X-Forwarded-For`; trust the immediate upstream
AWS ALB / Vercel / Fly.io	`1`	trust exactly one upstream hop (the platform load balancer)
Two-tier (CDN → ALB → app)	`2`	trust two hops

If you forget to set this, the symptom is X-Forwarded-For: 1.1.1.<random> letting an attacker bypass the magic-link limit (see issue #3 for the curl repro). The fix is one env var.

Deploy

Docker Compose

cp .env.example .env
docker compose up --build

Volume	Contents
`tweetly_state`	`/data` — sessions, media, logs
`tweetly_pgdata`	PostgreSQL data directory

Coolify

Service	Type	Notes
`tweetly-backend`	Application (Dockerfile)	`backend/` directory, `Dockerfile` build, port 3000
`tweetly-frontend`	Application (Dockerfile)	`frontend/` directory, build arg `NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=https://api.your-domain.com`
`tweetly-postgres`	Managed Postgres	Coolify add-on, 16-alpine, persistent volume

Backend env:

DATABASE_URL=postgres://tweetly:tweetly@<coolify-postgres>:5432/tweetly
NODE_ENV=production
X_EXECUTOR_MODE=patchright
APP_URL=https://panel.yourdomain.com
CORS_ORIGINS=https://panel.yourdomain.com
BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_TOKEN=<random-32-byte-hex>      # one-time
BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_EMAIL=you@yourdomain.com         # first user's email
# REDIS_URL=redis://<coolify-redis>:6379         # required for 2+ instances

Frontend build arg:

NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=https://api.your-domain.com

If you keep the panel.* ↔ api.* naming convention, NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL can be omitted — lib/api.ts derives it at runtime. Any other convention requires the build arg.

Persistent volume. The backend container mounts /data:

/data/user-data — X session profiles (cookie persistence)
/data/app-data/{errors,logs} — runtime artifacts

The Patchright Chromium binary lives at /app/browsers inside the image. Don't mount /data over /app/browsers — Coolify volume mounts shadow the in-image binary. In Coolify, set "Persistent Storage" → mount /data.

Bootstrap (one-time, post-deploy):

# 1. Create the first admin user
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"you@yourdomain.com"}' \
  https://api.your-domain.com/admin/users

# 2. Write the permanent admin token + SMTP credentials
curl -X PUT -H "Authorization: Bearer $BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "adminToken": "<another-random-32-byte-hex>",
    "mailProvider": "smtp",
    "smtpHost": "smtp.postmarkapp.com",
    "smtpPort": 587,
    "smtpUser": "<provider-user>",
    "smtpPass": "<provider-pass>",
    "mailFrom": "tweetly <noreply@yourdomain.com>"
  }' \
  https://api.your-domain.com/admin/secrets

# 3. Remove BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_TOKEN from Coolify env, redeploy
# 4. Frontend → /login → enter email → click magic link → in

Migrations. From Coolify "Run Command":

npm run db:migrate

Run once after the first deploy. Subsequent migrations don't auto-apply on container start — run the command manually.

Multi-instance scaling

tweetly runs in a single Node process with zero extra configuration. To scale horizontally there are four coordination points; three are handled in code, the fourth is a load-balancer setting:

Component	Multi-instance setup
Action ClaimWorker	Postgres `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` already safe — no extra config
Rate limiter	Set `REDIS_URL` — shared counter, all instances count toward the same limit
Monitor poller	`pg_try_advisory_lock` leader election — only one instance polls per cycle
MCP SSE	Sticky session required at the load balancer (see below)

Sticky session. The MCP SSE connection is long-lived; the same user's /mcp/messages POSTs must land on the instance that opened the SSE stream. Hash-based sticky on Authorization or cookie-based affinity in Caddy / nginx / Traefik is enough; Coolify's "Session affinity" toggle does the same.

REDIS_URL. Required when running 2+ instances (rate limit + MCP session registry). Single-instance dev/prod falls back to in-memory.

Verify multi-instance. Bring up two instances and fire 31 PUT requests for the same user: the 30th and beyond must return 429 even when they hit the second instance (shared Redis counter). Without Redis, each instance has its own counter, so 60 requests would slip through. Monitor poller: only one instance logs Polling N monitor(s) (leader).

Observability

GET /metrics requires bearer auth (secrets.admin_token). Example Prometheus scrape:

scrape_configs:
  - job_name: tweetly
    metrics_path: /metrics
    static_configs:
      - targets: ['api.your-domain.com:443']
    scheme: https
    bearer_token: <secrets.admin_token>

Metric	Type
`tweetly_action_total`	Counter
`tweetly_action_duration_ms`	Histogram
`tweetly_queue_depth`	Gauge
`tweetly_circuit_breaker_paused`	Gauge

Grafana Cloud free tier? Grafana Agent or Alloy accepts the same config. See docs/12-queue-alarms.md for alert templates calibrated against the queue metrics.

Contributing

Issues and pull requests welcome. Read CONTRIBUTING.md for development setup and PR conventions, and SECURITY.md for the vulnerability-disclosure process.

Open issues — tagged by area, severity, and difficulty
good first issue — scoped tasks for new contributors
security — open security reviews
Changelog

The main branch is protected: pull requests require a passing CI run (backend and frontend jobs) and one approving review. Conventional Commits are documented in CONTRIBUTING.md.

Acknowledgments

Built on the shoulders of:

Patchright — anti-detection Playwright fork that does the heavy lifting against X's bot defenses.
Model Context Protocol SDK — the spec and reference server that makes MCP integration ergonomic.
NestJS — the backend framework that keeps the modular boundaries honest.
TypeORM — the data layer behind the action engine queue.
Next.js and Shadcn — the panel framework and component library.
nodemailer — magic-link delivery.
prom-client — Prometheus metrics export.

License

Contributing · Security · Changelog · Issues · Releases

Name		Name	Last commit message	Last commit date
Latest commit History 253 Commits
.claude		.claude
.github		.github
backend		backend
docs		docs
frontend		frontend
.env.example		.env.example
.gitignore		.gitignore
CHANGELOG.md		CHANGELOG.md
CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md		CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
CONTRIBUTING.md		CONTRIBUTING.md
LICENSE		LICENSE
MAINTAINING.md		MAINTAINING.md
README.md		README.md
SECURITY.md		SECURITY.md
docker-compose.yml		docker-compose.yml
package-lock.json		package-lock.json
package.json		package.json

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tweetly

Table of contents

Disclaimer

Project status

Quick start

Architecture

High-level flow

Post-tweet sequence

Project layout

Action state machine

MCP tool surface

Setup

Commands

Smoke tests

Environment variables

SMTP credentials live in the database

Connect an X account

Session expiry semantics

API key onboarding

MCP connection

Webhook HMAC verification

Admin API

Rotating ENCRYPTION_KEY

Trust proxy (TRUST_PROXY)

Deploy

Docker Compose

Coolify

Multi-instance scaling

Observability

Contributing

Acknowledgments

License

About

Topics

Resources

License

Code of conduct

Contributing

Security policy

Uh oh!

Stars

Watchers

Forks

Releases

Packages 0

Uh oh!

Contributors

Uh oh!

Languages

Rotating `ENCRYPTION_KEY`

Trust proxy (`TRUST_PROXY`)

Packages